Version in base suite: 3.0.11-1+deb13u3 Version in overlay suite: 3.0.11-1+deb13u4 Base version: haproxy_3.0.11-1+deb13u4 Target version: haproxy_3.0.11-1+deb13u5 Base file: /srv/ftp-master.debian.org/ftp/pool/main/h/haproxy/haproxy_3.0.11-1+deb13u4.dsc Target file: /srv/ftp-master.debian.org/policy/pool/main/h/haproxy/haproxy_3.0.11-1+deb13u5.dsc changelog | 15 ++ patches/0001-BUG-MAJOR-buf-make-the-shift-distance-check-less-str.patch | 63 ++++++++++ patches/0001-BUG-MEDIUM-mux-fcgi-fix-uint16_t-overflow-in-drl-drp.patch | 49 +++++++ patches/0001-BUG-MEDIUM-mux-h1-only-accept-the-H2-preface-on-the-.patch | 55 ++++++++ patches/0001-BUG-MINOR-hpack-tbl-add-missing-NULL-check-after-hpa.patch | 48 +++++++ patches/0002-BUG-MAJOR-mux-h2-fail-on-impossible-data-transfers-i.patch | 54 ++++++++ patches/0003-BUG-MAJOR-h3-do-not-panic-on-HTX_FL_PARSING_ERROR-af.patch | 26 ++++ patches/0004-BUG-MAJOR-mux-quic-fail-on-impossible-data-transfers.patch | 49 +++++++ patches/series | 9 + 9 files changed, 368 insertions(+) dpkg-source: warning: cannot verify inline signature for /srv/release.debian.org/tmp/tmpu0y57u8g/haproxy_3.0.11-1+deb13u4.dsc: no acceptable signature found dpkg-source: warning: cannot verify inline signature for /srv/release.debian.org/tmp/tmpu0y57u8g/haproxy_3.0.11-1+deb13u5.dsc: no acceptable signature found diff -Nru haproxy-3.0.11/debian/changelog haproxy-3.0.11/debian/changelog --- haproxy-3.0.11/debian/changelog 2026-10-15 16:14:18.000000000 +0000 +++ haproxy-3.0.11/debian/changelog 2026-11-18 05:55:48.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,3 +1,18 @@ +haproxy (3.0.11-1+deb13u5) trixie-security; urgency=medium + + * BUG/MAJOR: buf: make the shift distance check less strict in b_move() + * BUG/MAJOR: mux-h2: fail on impossible data transfers in rcv_buf() + * BUG/MAJOR: h3: do not panic on HTX_FL_PARSING_ERROR after htx_xfer() + * BUG/MAJOR: mux-quic: fail on impossible data transfers in rcv_buf() + * BUG/MEDIUM: mux-fcgi: fix uint16_t overflow in drl += drp + (CVE-2026-55203) + * BUG/MINOR: hpack-tbl: add missing NULL check after hpack_dht_defrag() + (CVE-2026-55204) + * BUG/MEDIUM: mux-h1: only accept the H2 preface on the first request + (CVE-2026-110353) + + -- Vincent Bernat Wed, 18 Nov 2026 06:55:48 +0100 + haproxy (3.0.11-1+deb13u4) trixie-security; urgency=high * BUG/MAJOR: mux-h2: properly handle short reads on PING frames diff -Nru haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0001-BUG-MAJOR-buf-make-the-shift-distance-check-less-str.patch haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0001-BUG-MAJOR-buf-make-the-shift-distance-check-less-str.patch --- haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0001-BUG-MAJOR-buf-make-the-shift-distance-check-less-str.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0001-BUG-MAJOR-buf-make-the-shift-distance-check-less-str.patch 2026-11-18 05:55:48.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +From 91f333d5807e4f92e6dd05de4e2738592d28307f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Willy Tarreau +Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 16:21:26 +0100 +Subject: BUG/MAJOR: buf: make the shift distance check less strict in b_move() + +Yuqi Qiu and Xiang Li from Nankai University (AOSP Lab) found during +code analysis that the check "BUG_ON(-shift > size)" in b_move() is +incorrect and can trigger too easily. The test as written like this +to only consider a one-byte minimum move, but the function could also +be called either with a larger move and a large offset, or with no data +and a larger move, typically the result of a full buffer deletion. What +matters is that the moved data plus the shift do not go larger than the +buffer. + +Let's fix the test to consider both the length and the distance to save +it from triggering too easily. + +The test was added in 2.6-dev3 with commit 8873b85bd9 ("DEBUG: buf: add +BUG_ON_HOT() to most buffer management functions") so this fix must be +backported to all stable versions. +--- + src/buf.c | 14 +++++++------- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/include/haproxy/buf.h b/include/haproxy/buf.h +index ad22e6f1ff9b..390f7e8d5791 100644 +--- a/include/haproxy/buf.h ++++ b/include/haproxy/buf.h +@@ -868,11 +868,11 @@ static inline size_t b_force_xfer(struct buffer *dst, struct buffer *src, size_t + /* Moves bytes from absolute position of buffer by + * bytes, while supporting wrapping of both the source and the destination. + * The position is relative to the buffer's origin and may overlap with the +- * target position. The 's absolute value must be strictly lower than +- * the buffer's size. The main purpose is to aggregate data block during +- * parsing while removing unused delimiters. The buffer's length is not +- * modified, and the caller must take care of size adjustments and holes by +- * itself. ++ * target position. The 's absolute value plus the being moved ++ * must be lower than or equal to the buffer's size. The main purpose is to ++ * aggregate data block during parsing while removing unused delimiters. The ++ * buffer's length is not modified, and the caller must take care of size ++ * adjustments and holes by itself. + */ + static inline void b_move(const struct buffer *b, size_t src, size_t len, ssize_t shift) + { +@@ -887,7 +887,7 @@ static inline void b_move(const struct buffer *b, size_t src, size_t len, ssize_ + dst -= size; + + if (shift < 0) { +- BUG_ON(-shift >= size); ++ BUG_ON(-shift + len > size); + /* copy from left to right */ + for (; (cnt = len); len -= cnt) { + if (cnt > size - src) +@@ -905,7 +905,7 @@ static inline void b_move(const struct buffer *b, size_t src, size_t len, ssize_ + } + } + else if (shift > 0) { +- BUG_ON(shift >= size); ++ BUG_ON(shift + len > size); + /* copy from right to left */ + for (; (cnt = len); len -= cnt) { + size_t src_end = src + len; diff -Nru haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0001-BUG-MEDIUM-mux-fcgi-fix-uint16_t-overflow-in-drl-drp.patch haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0001-BUG-MEDIUM-mux-fcgi-fix-uint16_t-overflow-in-drl-drp.patch --- haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0001-BUG-MEDIUM-mux-fcgi-fix-uint16_t-overflow-in-drl-drp.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0001-BUG-MEDIUM-mux-fcgi-fix-uint16_t-overflow-in-drl-drp.patch 2026-11-18 05:55:48.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +From 3a4c65923c604bac87f67e8ee7e49b1709dc8d2e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tristan Madani +Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 10:46:03 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MEDIUM: mux-fcgi: fix uint16_t overflow in drl += drp + +The FCGI demux record length field (drl) is uint16_t. In the +ignore_record path, the expression "fconn->drl += fconn->drp" overflows +to 0 when contentLength=65535 and paddingLength>=1. This causes the +state machine to consider the record complete without consuming any +buffer data. The remaining buffer contents are then parsed as new FCGI +record headers. + +The same drl+=drp pattern at lines 2382/2418/2475 is not affected +because drl is guaranteed to be 0 at those points (all content bytes +are consumed before reaching end_transfer). + +Widen drl from uint16_t to uint32_t so that the addition of drp +(uint8_t, max 255) cannot overflow. + +Reported-by: Tristan (@TristanInSec) +(cherry picked from commit 5985276735777634d8c85f1d73bb7764aab0d6dd) +Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet +(cherry picked from commit fc300e9f2ce352516341503e8bc62f4c0b429627) +[cf: not mentionned but must be backported to all supported versions] +Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet +(cherry picked from commit 5b7d7be628990fc6f7e7bd98365b88b32ab6177d) +Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet +(cherry picked from commit 7e304a247e0e0192a05ff949c38bb404eeeac954) +Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet +--- + src/mux_fcgi.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/mux_fcgi.c b/src/mux_fcgi.c +index 239810697d70..bd6559876043 100644 +--- a/src/mux_fcgi.c ++++ b/src/mux_fcgi.c +@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ struct fcgi_conn { + uint32_t flags; /* Connection flags: FCGI_CF_* */ + + int16_t dsi; /* dmux stream ID (<0 = idle ) */ +- uint16_t drl; /* demux record length (if dsi >= 0) */ ++ uint32_t drl; /* demux record length (if dsi >= 0) */ + uint8_t drt; /* demux record type (if dsi >= 0) */ + uint8_t drp; /* demux record padding (if dsi >= 0) */ + +-- +2.55.0 + diff -Nru haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0001-BUG-MEDIUM-mux-h1-only-accept-the-H2-preface-on-the-.patch haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0001-BUG-MEDIUM-mux-h1-only-accept-the-H2-preface-on-the-.patch --- haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0001-BUG-MEDIUM-mux-h1-only-accept-the-H2-preface-on-the-.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0001-BUG-MEDIUM-mux-h1-only-accept-the-H2-preface-on-the-.patch 2026-11-18 05:55:48.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +From e1672c9ca04c81b544a60e316eb2bb4af02381e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christopher Faulet +Date: Wed, 7 Oct 2026 11:53:15 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MEDIUM: mux-h1: only accept the H2 preface on the first + request + +The H1 to H2 upgrade via the H2 connection preface is only supported for the +first request of a connection. It is checked by testing the absence of +H1C_F_WAIT_NEXT_REQ, which is set on the H1 connection once a first +transaction is finished. But this flag is moved to the H1 stream +(H1S_F_NOT_FIRST) and removed from the connection as soon as a new H1 stream +is created, which happens when the beginning of the next request is +received. So when the preface of a second request is received in several +parts (e.g. "PRI " then the rest), the first part creates an embryonic H1 +stream and clears the flag, and the upgrade is then accepted when the +complete preface is received. The connection is upgraded to H2 in the middle +of its life, while the end of the previous response may still be pending in +the output buffer (it is then lost). + +Now the H1 stream's H1S_F_NOT_FIRST flag is also checked. + +This was introduced by commit 39c7b6b09 ("MEDIUM: mux-h1: Add ST_READY +state for the H1 connections") in 2.4. It may be backported to all +stable versions. + +(cherry picked from commit cec63e95f62a7412484f1134f5aa227e5b7e1466) +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit 16acce1dac1dcf1ad5d654204af3a5d45d0e3de8) +[wt: ctx adj: the condition was upper in the if chain] +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit 05018a2735db3b3736fde2612646f985b24cb760) +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit 31a657a0ea846a42fa3eac2409de88f0dce9e2af) +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +--- + src/mux_h1.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/mux_h1.c b/src/mux_h1.c +index 1f6ea482a227..a364f313e13f 100644 +--- a/src/mux_h1.c ++++ b/src/mux_h1.c +@@ -3985,7 +3985,8 @@ static int h1_process(struct h1c * h1c) + + /* First of all handle H1 to H2 upgrade (no need to create the H1 stream) */ + if (h1c->state != H1_CS_DRAINING && /* Not draining message */ +- !(h1c->flags & H1C_F_WAIT_NEXT_REQ) && /* First request */ ++ !(h1c->flags & H1C_F_WAIT_NEXT_REQ) && /* First request (the flag is */ ++ !(h1s && (h1s->flags & H1S_F_NOT_FIRST)) && /* moved to the h1s once created) */ + !(h1c->px->options2 & PR_O2_NO_H2_UPGRADE) && /* H2 upgrade supported by the proxy */ + !(conn->mux->flags & MX_FL_NO_UPG)) { /* the current mux supports upgrades */ + /* Try to match H2 preface before parsing the request headers. */ +-- +2.55.0 + diff -Nru haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0001-BUG-MINOR-hpack-tbl-add-missing-NULL-check-after-hpa.patch haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0001-BUG-MINOR-hpack-tbl-add-missing-NULL-check-after-hpa.patch --- haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0001-BUG-MINOR-hpack-tbl-add-missing-NULL-check-after-hpa.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0001-BUG-MINOR-hpack-tbl-add-missing-NULL-check-after-hpa.patch 2026-11-18 05:55:48.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +From 7ab3ba6fc7e6e875361dd569165a31c2060cf96d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tristan Madani +Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 10:42:10 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MINOR: hpack-tbl: add missing NULL check after + hpack_dht_defrag() + +hpack_dht_insert() has three call sites for hpack_dht_defrag(). Two of +them (lines 293 and 306) correctly check for a NULL return and bail out +with -1. The third (line 353, data-space defrag path) assigns the return +value to dht and immediately dereferences it without a NULL check. + +When pool_head_hpack_tbl is exhausted, hpack_dht_alloc() returns NULL, +hpack_dht_defrag() propagates it, and line 354 dereferences NULL+0x0a +(offsetof wrap), crashing the worker with SIGSEGV. + +Add a NULL check consistent with the two other call sites. + +This must be backported to all stable versions. + +Reported-by: Tristan (@TristanInSec) +(cherry picked from commit 9a6d1fe3f00d86ab4ea6ea6ea0a5d48fc058a513) +Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet +(cherry picked from commit 26295061316c136db34d632987b62fc57d7ba228) +Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet +(cherry picked from commit 0626948fdf1bef6297b90b4f34ec3060114cd7c4) +Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet +(cherry picked from commit 985342fef315928c1b8211c5d9227c05c271bdc7) +Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet +--- + src/hpack-tbl.c | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/hpack-tbl.c b/src/hpack-tbl.c +index 990d2f7ddf93..92a6f4435510 100644 +--- a/src/hpack-tbl.c ++++ b/src/hpack-tbl.c +@@ -351,6 +351,8 @@ int hpack_dht_insert(struct hpack_dht *dht, struct ist name, struct ist value) + else { + /* need to defragment the table before inserting upfront */ + dht = hpack_dht_defrag(dht); ++ if (!dht) ++ return -1; + wrap = dht->wrap + 1; + head = dht->head + 1; + dht->dte[head].addr = dht->dte[dht->front].addr - (name.len + value.len); +-- +2.55.0 + diff -Nru haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0002-BUG-MAJOR-mux-h2-fail-on-impossible-data-transfers-i.patch haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0002-BUG-MAJOR-mux-h2-fail-on-impossible-data-transfers-i.patch --- haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0002-BUG-MAJOR-mux-h2-fail-on-impossible-data-transfers-i.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0002-BUG-MAJOR-mux-h2-fail-on-impossible-data-transfers-i.patch 2026-11-18 05:55:48.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +From 3db16867932cc06fb62de2fca724959ee36ecc2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Willy Tarreau +Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 18:27:58 +0100 +Subject: BUG/MAJOR: mux-h2: fail on impossible data transfers in rcv_buf() + +When some data couldn't be transferred from the rxbuf to the channel, +leaving the channel empty (e.g. due to the reserve), we must not set +SE_FL_WANT_ROOM otherwise we cannot get out of this situation. There's +even already a BUG_ON() for this. However it turns out that in some +tricky circumstances it can be triggered. The test is thus not correct +and instead we should simply report a stream error. + +This needs to be backported as far as 2.6. + +Many thanks to Adam Crawford for reporting this issue along with a +repro and a candidate fix. In the end the current fix is different +as it addresses the root cause (WANT_ROOM + no-data) so it should +be more future-proof. +--- + src/mux_h2.c | 11 ++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/mux_h2.c b/src/mux_h2.c +index f38a5f61f6f4..5fa03e3a56a4 100644 +--- a/src/mux_h2.c ++++ b/src/mux_h2.c +@@ -7039,8 +7039,18 @@ static size_t h2_rcv_buf(struct stconn *sc, struct buffer *buf, size_t count, in + ret -= h2s_htx->data; + + end: +- if (b_data(&h2s->rxbuf)) ++ if (b_data(&h2s->rxbuf)) { ++ if (!buf->data) { ++ /* we have pending data and the output buf is empty, ++ * this is typical of too large a non-fragmentable ++ * data (e.g headers, trailers) combined with a ++ * reserve, so this will never unblock. ++ */ ++ se_fl_set(h2s->sd, SE_FL_ERROR); ++ goto leave; ++ } + se_fl_set(h2s->sd, SE_FL_RCV_MORE | SE_FL_WANT_ROOM); ++ } + else { + if (!(h2c->flags & H2_CF_IS_BACK) && (h2s->flags & (H2_SF_BODY_TUNNEL|H2_SF_ES_RCVD))) { + /* If request ES is reported to the upper layer, it means the +@@ -7063,6 +7073,7 @@ static size_t h2_rcv_buf(struct stconn *sc, struct buffer *buf, size_t count, in + h2c_restart_reading(h2c, 1); + } + ++ leave: + TRACE_LEAVE(H2_EV_STRM_RECV, h2c->conn, h2s); + return ret; + } diff -Nru haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0003-BUG-MAJOR-h3-do-not-panic-on-HTX_FL_PARSING_ERROR-af.patch haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0003-BUG-MAJOR-h3-do-not-panic-on-HTX_FL_PARSING_ERROR-af.patch --- haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0003-BUG-MAJOR-h3-do-not-panic-on-HTX_FL_PARSING_ERROR-af.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0003-BUG-MAJOR-h3-do-not-panic-on-HTX_FL_PARSING_ERROR-af.patch 2026-11-18 05:55:48.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +From 9c52a0b088e3958e1f801854b78a04a3819365c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Willy Tarreau +Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 17:41:01 +0100 +Subject: BUG/MAJOR: h3: do not panic on HTX_FL_PARSING_ERROR after htx_xfer() + +After various tests and a long code analysis, it turns out that this +condition which was thought never to be triggerable can finally be +triggered if some data cannot be transferred to the channel due to +the reserve. The condition is rare but not impossible, so let's get +rid of it. This patch must be backported to all stable releases. +--- + src/qcm_http.c | 1 - + 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/qmux_http.c b/src/qmux_http.c +index 092eb15da9ae..d8526b35a1ac 100644 +--- a/src/qmux_http.c ++++ b/src/qmux_http.c +@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ size_t qcs_http_rcv_buf(struct qcs *qcs, struct buffer *buf, size_t count, + } + + htx_xfer_blks(cs_htx, qcs_htx, count, HTX_BLK_UNUSED); +- BUG_ON(qcs_htx->flags & HTX_FL_PARSING_ERROR); + + /* Copy EOM from src to dst buffer if all data copied. */ + if (htx_is_empty(qcs_htx) && (qcs_htx->flags & HTX_FL_EOM)) { diff -Nru haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0004-BUG-MAJOR-mux-quic-fail-on-impossible-data-transfers.patch haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0004-BUG-MAJOR-mux-quic-fail-on-impossible-data-transfers.patch --- haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0004-BUG-MAJOR-mux-quic-fail-on-impossible-data-transfers.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/0004-BUG-MAJOR-mux-quic-fail-on-impossible-data-transfers.patch 2026-11-18 05:55:48.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +From 943b9ce4af536a55b5ee7654ecea83d3a232cb28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Willy Tarreau +Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 17:55:22 +0100 +Subject: BUG/MAJOR: mux-quic: fail on impossible data transfers in rcv_buf() + +When some data couldn't be transferred from the rxbuf to the channel, +leaving the channel empty (e.g. due to the reserve), we must not set +SE_FL_WANT_ROOM otherwise we cannot get out of this situation and +sc_conn_recv() detects it and panics. Let's just report a stream +error for non-fragmentable contents that exceed the maximum size +and stop here. + +This must be backported to all versions. +--- + src/mux_quic.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/mux_quic.c b/src/mux_quic.c +index 8fe2fbc4bc89..aa5853699a39 100644 +--- a/src/mux_quic.c ++++ b/src/mux_quic.c +@@ -2963,7 +2963,18 @@ static size_t qmux_strm_rcv_buf(struct stconn *sc, struct buffer *buf, + ret = qcs_http_rcv_buf(qcs, buf, count, &fin); + + if (b_data(&qcs->rx.app_buf)) { +- se_fl_set(qcs->sd, SE_FL_RCV_MORE | SE_FL_WANT_ROOM); ++ if (b_data(buf)) ++ se_fl_set(qcs->sd, SE_FL_RCV_MORE | SE_FL_WANT_ROOM); ++ else { ++ /* we have pending data and the output buf is empty, ++ * this is typical of too large a non-fragmentable ++ * data (e.g headers, trailers) combined with a ++ * reserve, so this will never unblock. ++ */ ++ TRACE_STATE("report xfer error", QMUX_EV_STRM_RECV, qcc->conn, qcs); ++ se_fl_set(qcs->sd, SE_FL_ERROR); ++ goto leave; ++ } + } + else { + se_fl_clr(qcs->sd, SE_FL_RCV_MORE | SE_FL_WANT_ROOM); +@@ -3017,6 +3028,7 @@ static size_t qmux_strm_rcv_buf(struct stconn *sc, struct buffer *buf, + tasklet_wakeup(qcc->wait_event.tasklet); + } + ++leave: + TRACE_LEAVE(QMUX_EV_STRM_RECV, qcc->conn, qcs); + + return ret; diff -Nru haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/series haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/series --- haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/series 2026-10-15 16:14:18.000000000 +0000 +++ haproxy-3.0.11/debian/patches/series 2026-11-18 05:55:48.000000000 +0000 @@ -26,5 +26,14 @@ 0001-BUG-MAJOR-mux-h2-properly-handle-short-reads-on-PING.patch 0001-BUG-MAJOR-h1-htx-report-an-error-on-a-too-long-chunk.patch +0001-BUG-MEDIUM-mux-fcgi-fix-uint16_t-overflow-in-drl-drp.patch +0001-BUG-MEDIUM-mux-h1-only-accept-the-H2-preface-on-the-.patch +0001-BUG-MINOR-hpack-tbl-add-missing-NULL-check-after-hpa.patch + +0001-BUG-MAJOR-buf-make-the-shift-distance-check-less-str.patch +0002-BUG-MAJOR-mux-h2-fail-on-impossible-data-transfers-i.patch +0003-BUG-MAJOR-h3-do-not-panic-on-HTX_FL_PARSING_ERROR-af.patch +0004-BUG-MAJOR-mux-quic-fail-on-impossible-data-transfers.patch + # applied during the build process: # debianize-dconv.patch