Version in base suite: 2025.88-2

Base version: dropbear_2025.88-2
Target version: dropbear_2025.89-1~deb13u1
Base file: /srv/ftp-master.debian.org/ftp/pool/main/d/dropbear/dropbear_2025.88-2.dsc
Target file: /srv/ftp-master.debian.org/policy/pool/main/d/dropbear/dropbear_2025.89-1~deb13u1.dsc

 .github/workflows/build.yml |    8 +++
 CHANGES                     |   57 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 Makefile.in                 |    2 
 configure                   |   14 ++---
 configure.ac                |    7 --
 debian/changelog            |   18 +++++++
 debian/salsa-ci.yml         |    5 ++
 debian/tests/control        |    1 
 release.sh                  |    2 
 src/auth.h                  |    5 ++
 src/cli-main.c              |   12 ++++
 src/common-channel.c        |   17 ++++--
 src/common-chansession.c    |    2 
 src/config.h.in             |    3 +
 src/default_options.h       |    8 ++-
 src/loginrec.c              |   25 ++--------
 src/loginrec.h              |    6 +-
 src/runopts.h               |    1 
 src/scp.c                   |   38 +++++++++++----
 src/session.h               |    6 ++
 src/svr-agentfwd.c          |   14 ++++-
 src/svr-auth.c              |  110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 src/svr-authpubkey.c        |   10 +++-
 src/svr-authpubkeyoptions.c |    6 ++
 src/svr-chansession.c       |   34 ++++---------
 src/svr-kex.c               |    8 +++
 src/svr-runopts.c           |   24 +++++++++
 src/svr-tcpfwd.c            |    5 ++
 src/sysoptions.h            |   23 ++++++---
 test/test_dropbear.py       |    2 
 30 files changed, 376 insertions(+), 97 deletions(-)

diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/.github/workflows/build.yml dropbear-2025.89/.github/workflows/build.yml
--- dropbear-2025.88/.github/workflows/build.yml	2025-05-07 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/.github/workflows/build.yml	2025-12-16 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
@@ -78,6 +78,9 @@
             # fails with:
             # .../ranlib: file: libtomcrypt.a(cbc_setiv.o) has no symbols
             ranlib: ranlib -no_warning_for_no_symbols
+            # macos doesn't have setresgid
+            localoptions: |
+              #define DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS 0
 
           - name: macos 15
             os: macos-15
@@ -90,6 +93,9 @@
             # fails with:
             # .../ranlib: file: libtomcrypt.a(cbc_setiv.o) has no symbols
             ranlib: ranlib -no_warning_for_no_symbols
+            # macos doesn't have setresgid
+            localoptions: |
+              #define DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS 0
 
           # Check that debug code doesn't bitrot
           - name: DEBUG_TRACE
@@ -227,6 +233,8 @@
           echo "#define DROPBEAR_SVR_PASSWORD_AUTH 0" >> localoptions.h
           # 1 second timeout is too short
           sed -i "s/DEFAULT_IDLE_TIMEOUT 1/DEFAULT_IDLE_TIMEOUT 99/" localoptions.h
+          # DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS is on by default, turn it off
+          echo "#define DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS 0" >> localoptions.h
 
       - name: make
         run: |
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/CHANGES dropbear-2025.89/CHANGES
--- dropbear-2025.88/CHANGES	2025-05-07 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/CHANGES	2025-12-16 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
@@ -1,3 +1,60 @@
+2025.89 - 16 December 2025
+
+- Security: Avoid privilege escalation via unix stream forwarding in Dropbear
+  server. Other programs on a system may authenticate unix sockets via
+  SO_PEERCRED, which would be root user for Dropbear forwarded connections,
+  allowing root privilege escalation.
+  Reported by Turistu, and thanks for advice on the fix.
+  This is tracked as CVE-2025-14282, and affects 2024.84 to 2025.88.
+
+  It is fixed by dropping privileges of the dropbear process after
+  authentication. Unix stream sockets are now disallowed when a
+  forced command is used, either with authorized_key restrictions or
+  "dropbear -c command".
+
+  In previous affected releases running with "dropbear -j" (will also disable
+  TCP fowarding) or building with localoptions.h/distrooptions.h
+  "#define DROPBEAR_SVR_LOCALSTREAMFWD 0" is a mitigation.
+
+- Security: Include scp fix for CVE-2019-6111. This allowed
+  a malicious server to overwrite arbitrary local files.
+  The missing fix was reported by Ashish Kunwar.
+
+- Server dropping privileges post-auth is enabled by default. This requires
+  setresgid() support, so some platforms such as netbsd or macos will have to
+  disable DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS in localoptions.h. Unix stream forwarding is
+  not available if DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS is disabled.
+
+  Remote server TCP socket forwarding will now use OS privileged port
+  restrictions rather than having a fixed "allow >=1024 for non-root" rule.
+
+  A future release may implement privilege dropping for netbsd/macos.
+
+- Fix a regression in 2025.87 when RSA and DSS are not built. This would lead
+  to a crash at startup with bad_bufptr().
+  Reported by Dani Schmitt and Sebastian Priebe.
+
+- Don't limit channel window to 500MB. That is could cause stuck connections
+  if peers advise a large window and don't send an increment within 500MB.
+  Affects SSH.NET https://github.com/sshnet/SSH.NET/issues/1671
+  Reported by Rob Hague.
+
+- Ignore -g -s when passwords arent enabled. Patch from Norbert Lange.
+  Ignore -m (disable MOTD), -j/-k (tcp forwarding) when not enabled.
+
+- Report SIGBUS and SIGTRAP signals. Patch from Loïc Mangeonjean.
+
+- Fix incorrect server auth delay. Was meant to be 250-350ms, it was actually
+  150-350ms or possibly negative (zero). Reported by pickaxprograms.
+
+- Fix building without public key options. Thanks to Konstantin Demin
+
+- Fix building with proxycmd but without netcat. Thanks to Konstantin Demin
+
+- Fix incorrect path documentation for distrooptions, thanks to Todd Zullinger
+
+- Fix SO_REUSEADDR for TCP tests, reported by vt-alt.
+
 2025.88 - 7 May 2025
 
 - Security: Don't allow dbclient hostname arguments to be interpreted
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/Makefile.in dropbear-2025.89/Makefile.in
--- dropbear-2025.88/Makefile.in	2025-05-07 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/Makefile.in	2025-12-16 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@
 	cd $(srcdir); ./dropbear_lint.sh
 
 check: lint
-	make -C test
+	$(MAKE) -C test
 
 ## Fuzzing targets
 
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/configure dropbear-2025.89/configure
--- dropbear-2025.88/configure	2025-05-07 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/configure	2025-12-16 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
@@ -2979,13 +2979,6 @@
 
 
 
-# Record which revision is being built
-if test -s "`which hg`" && test -d "$srcdir/.hg"; then
-	hgrev=`hg id -i -R "$srcdir"`
-	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: Source directory Mercurial base revision $hgrev" >&5
-printf "%s\n" "$as_me: Source directory Mercurial base revision $hgrev" >&6;}
-fi
-
 ORIGCFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
 LATE_CFLAGS=""
 # Checks for programs.
@@ -7597,6 +7590,13 @@
 
 fi
 
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setresgid" "ac_cv_func_setresgid"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_setresgid" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SETRESGID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
 
 # Might be a macro. Might be sys/endian.h on BSDs
 ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "endian.h" "ac_cv_header_endian_h" "$ac_includes_default"
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/configure.ac dropbear-2025.89/configure.ac
--- dropbear-2025.88/configure.ac	2025-05-07 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/configure.ac	2025-12-16 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
@@ -8,12 +8,6 @@
 AC_PREREQ([2.59])
 AC_INIT
 
-# Record which revision is being built
-if test -s "`which hg`" && test -d "$srcdir/.hg"; then
-	hgrev=`hg id -i -R "$srcdir"`
-	AC_MSG_NOTICE([Source directory Mercurial base revision $hgrev])
-fi
-
 ORIGCFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
 LATE_CFLAGS=""
 # Checks for programs.
@@ -545,6 +539,7 @@
 AC_CHECK_FUNCS(endutxent getutxent getutxid getutxline pututxline )
 AC_CHECK_FUNCS(setutxent utmpxname)
 AC_CHECK_FUNCS(logout updwtmp logwtmp)
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS(setresgid)
 
 # Might be a macro. Might be sys/endian.h on BSDs
 AC_CHECK_HEADERS([endian.h])
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/debian/changelog dropbear-2025.89/debian/changelog
--- dropbear-2025.88/debian/changelog	2025-07-08 21:05:41.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/debian/changelog	2025-12-16 19:36:49.000000000 +0000
@@ -1,3 +1,21 @@
+dropbear (2025.89-1~deb13u1) trixie-security; urgency=high
+
+  * New upstream security and bugfix release (closes: #1123069).
+    + Fix CVE-2025-14282: Privilege escalation via unix stream forwarding in
+      Dropbear server. Other programs on a system may authenticate unix
+      sockets via SO_PEERCRED, which would be root user for Dropbear forwarded
+      connections, allowing root privilege escalation.
+    + The server now drops privileges of the dropbear process after
+      authentication.
+    + Remote server TCP socket forwarding will now use OS privileged port
+      restrictions rather than having a fixed "allow >=1024 for non-root"
+      rule.
+    + Unix stream sockets are now disallowed when a forced command is used,
+      either with authorized_key restrictions or "dropbear -c command".
+  * DEP-8: Add "Depends: e2fsprogs" to remote-unlocking test.
+
+ -- Guilhem Moulin <guilhem@debian.org>  Tue, 16 Dec 2025 20:36:49 +0100
+
 dropbear (2025.88-2) unstable; urgency=medium
 
   [ Guilhem Moulin ]
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/debian/salsa-ci.yml dropbear-2025.89/debian/salsa-ci.yml
--- dropbear-2025.88/debian/salsa-ci.yml	2025-07-08 21:05:41.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/debian/salsa-ci.yml	2025-12-16 19:36:49.000000000 +0000
@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
 ---
 include:
   - https://salsa.debian.org/salsa-ci-team/pipeline/raw/master/recipes/debian.yml
+
+variables:
+  RELEASE: 'trixie'
+  SALSA_CI_DISABLE_REPROTEST: 1
+  SALSA_CI_DISABLE_LINTIAN: 1
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/debian/tests/control dropbear-2025.89/debian/tests/control
--- dropbear-2025.88/debian/tests/control	2025-07-08 21:05:41.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/debian/tests/control	2025-12-16 19:36:49.000000000 +0000
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 # Only dependencies required to set the VM here are listed here;
 # dropbear-initramfs is not listed since we only install it in the VM.
 Depends: cryptsetup-initramfs,
+         e2fsprogs,
          fdisk,
          initramfs-tools-core,
          linux-image-generic,
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/release.sh dropbear-2025.89/release.sh
--- dropbear-2025.88/release.sh	2025-05-07 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/release.sh	2025-12-16 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
     TESTREL=0
 fi
 
-VERSION=$(echo '#include "src/default_options.h"\n#include "src/sysoptions.h"\necho DROPBEAR_VERSION' | cpp -DHAVE_CRYPT - | sh)
+VERSION=$(echo '#include "src/default_options.h"\n#include "src/sysoptions.h"\necho DROPBEAR_VERSION' | cpp -DHAVE_CRYPT -DHAVE_SETRESGID - | sh)
 
 if [ $TESTREL -eq 1 ]; then
     echo Making test tarball for "$VERSION" ...
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/src/auth.h dropbear-2025.89/src/auth.h
--- dropbear-2025.88/src/auth.h	2025-05-07 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/src/auth.h	2025-12-16 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
@@ -40,12 +40,16 @@
 void svr_auth_password(int valid_user);
 void svr_auth_pubkey(int valid_user);
 void svr_auth_pam(int valid_user);
+void svr_switch_user(void);
+void svr_raise_gid_utmp(void);
+void svr_restore_gid(void);
 
 #if DROPBEAR_SVR_PUBKEY_OPTIONS_BUILT
 int svr_pubkey_allows_agentfwd(void);
 int svr_pubkey_allows_tcpfwd(void);
 int svr_pubkey_allows_x11fwd(void);
 int svr_pubkey_allows_pty(void);
+int svr_pubkey_has_forced_command(void);
 int svr_pubkey_allows_local_tcpfwd(const char *host, unsigned int port);
 void svr_pubkey_set_forced_command(struct ChanSess *chansess);
 void svr_pubkey_options_cleanup(void);
@@ -56,6 +60,7 @@
 #define svr_pubkey_allows_tcpfwd() 1
 #define svr_pubkey_allows_x11fwd() 1
 #define svr_pubkey_allows_pty() 1
+#define svr_pubkey_has_forced_command() 0
 static inline int svr_pubkey_allows_local_tcpfwd(const char *host, unsigned int port)
 	{ (void)host; (void)port; return 1; }
 
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/src/cli-main.c dropbear-2025.89/src/cli-main.c
--- dropbear-2025.88/src/cli-main.c	2025-05-07 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/src/cli-main.c	2025-12-16 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
@@ -77,7 +77,11 @@
 	}
 
 #if DROPBEAR_CLI_PROXYCMD
-	if (cli_opts.proxycmd || cli_opts.proxyexec) {
+	if (cli_opts.proxycmd
+#if DROPBEAR_CLI_MULTIHOP
+		|| cli_opts.proxyexec
+#endif
+	) {
 		cli_proxy_cmd(&sock_in, &sock_out, &proxy_cmd_pid);
 		if (signal(SIGINT, kill_proxy_sighandler) == SIG_ERR ||
 			signal(SIGTERM, kill_proxy_sighandler) == SIG_ERR ||
@@ -110,11 +114,13 @@
 	dropbear_exit("Failed to run '%s'\n", cmd);
 }
 
+#if DROPBEAR_CLI_MULTIHOP
 static void exec_proxy_cmd(const void *unused) {
 	(void)unused;
 	run_command(cli_opts.proxyexec[0], cli_opts.proxyexec, ses.maxfd);
 	dropbear_exit("Failed to run '%s'\n", cli_opts.proxyexec[0]);
 }
+#endif
 
 static void cli_proxy_cmd(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, pid_t *pid_out) {
 	char * cmd_arg = NULL;
@@ -145,9 +151,11 @@
 		cmd_arg = m_malloc(shell_cmdlen);
 		snprintf(cmd_arg, shell_cmdlen, "exec %s", cli_opts.proxycmd);
 		exec_fn = shell_proxy_cmd;
+#if DROPBEAR_CLI_MULTIHOP
 	} else {
 		/* No shell */
 		exec_fn = exec_proxy_cmd;
+#endif
 	}
 
 	ret = spawn_command(exec_fn, cmd_arg, sock_out, sock_in, NULL, pid_out);
@@ -159,6 +167,7 @@
 cleanup:
 	m_free(cli_opts.proxycmd);
 	m_free(cmd_arg);
+#if DROPBEAR_CLI_MULTIHOP
 	if (cli_opts.proxyexec) {
 		char **a = NULL;
 		for (a = cli_opts.proxyexec; *a; a++) {
@@ -166,6 +175,7 @@
 		}
 		m_free(cli_opts.proxyexec);
 	}
+#endif
 }
 
 static void kill_proxy_sighandler(int UNUSED(signo)) {
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/src/common-channel.c dropbear-2025.89/src/common-channel.c
--- dropbear-2025.88/src/common-channel.c	2025-05-07 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/src/common-channel.c	2025-12-16 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
@@ -858,17 +858,21 @@
 void recv_msg_channel_window_adjust() {
 
 	struct Channel * channel;
-	unsigned int incr;
+	unsigned int incr, newwin;
 	
 	channel = getchannel();
 	
 	incr = buf_getint(ses.payload);
-	TRACE(("received window increment %d", incr))
-	incr = MIN(incr, TRANS_MAX_WIN_INCR);
+	TRACE(("received window increment %u", incr))
 	
-	channel->transwindow += incr;
-	channel->transwindow = MIN(channel->transwindow, TRANS_MAX_WINDOW);
-
+	newwin = channel->transwindow + incr;
+	if (newwin < channel->transwindow) {
+		/* Integer overflow, clamp it at maximum.
+		 * Behaviour may be unexpected, senders MUST NOT overflow per rfc4254. */
+		TRACE(("overflow window, prev %u", channel->transwindow));
+		newwin = 0xffffffff;
+	}
+	channel->transwindow = newwin;
 }
 
 /* Increment the incoming data window for a channel, and let the remote
@@ -906,7 +910,6 @@
 
 	remotechan = buf_getint(ses.payload);
 	transwindow = buf_getint(ses.payload);
-	transwindow = MIN(transwindow, TRANS_MAX_WINDOW);
 	transmaxpacket = buf_getint(ses.payload);
 	transmaxpacket = MIN(transmaxpacket, TRANS_MAX_PAYLOAD_LEN);
 
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/src/common-chansession.c dropbear-2025.89/src/common-chansession.c
--- dropbear-2025.88/src/common-chansession.c	2025-05-07 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/src/common-chansession.c	2025-12-16 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 const struct SigMap signames[] = {
 	{SIGABRT, "ABRT"},
 	{SIGALRM, "ALRM"},
+	{SIGBUS, "BUS"},
 	{SIGFPE, "FPE"},
 	{SIGHUP, "HUP"},
 	{SIGILL, "ILL"},
@@ -37,6 +38,7 @@
 	{SIGQUIT, "QUIT"},
 	{SIGSEGV, "SEGV"},
 	{SIGTERM, "TERM"},
+	{SIGTRAP, "TRAP"},
 	{SIGUSR1, "USR1"},
 	{SIGUSR2, "USR2"},
 	{0, NULL}
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/src/config.h.in dropbear-2025.89/src/config.h.in
--- dropbear-2025.88/src/config.h.in	2025-05-07 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/src/config.h.in	2025-12-16 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
@@ -231,6 +231,9 @@
 /* Define to 1 if you have the <security/pam_appl.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H
 
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setresgid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETRESGID
+
 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setutent' function. */
 #undef HAVE_SETUTENT
 
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/src/default_options.h dropbear-2025.89/src/default_options.h
--- dropbear-2025.88/src/default_options.h	2025-05-07 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/src/default_options.h	2025-12-16 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 used if it exists in the build directory. Options defined there will override
 any options in this file.
 
-Customisations will also be taken from src/distoptions.h if it exists.
+Customisations will also be taken from src/distrooptions.h if it exists.
 
 Options can also be defined with -DDROPBEAR_XXX=[0,1] in Makefile CFLAGS
 
@@ -303,6 +303,12 @@
 /* -T server option overrides */
 #define MAX_AUTH_TRIES 10
 
+/* Change server process to user privileges after authentication. */
+#ifndef DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS
+/* Default is enabled. Should only be disabled if platforms are incompatible */
+#define DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS DROPBEAR_SVR_MULTIUSER
+#endif
+
 /* Delay introduced before closing an unauthenticated session (seconds).
    Disabled by default, can be set to say 30 seconds to reduce the speed
    of password brute forcing. Note that there is a risk of denial of
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/src/loginrec.c dropbear-2025.89/src/loginrec.c
--- dropbear-2025.88/src/loginrec.c	2025-05-07 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/src/loginrec.c	2025-12-16 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
@@ -193,32 +193,24 @@
  *
  * Call with a pointer to a struct logininfo initialised with
  * login_init_entry() or login_alloc_entry()
- *
- * Returns:
- *  >0 if successful
- *  0  on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics)
  */
-int
+void
 login_login (struct logininfo *li)
 {
 	li->type = LTYPE_LOGIN;
-	return login_write(li);
+	login_write(li);
 }
 
 
 /* login_logout(struct logininfo *)     - Record a logout
  *
  * Call as with login_login()
- *
- * Returns:
- *  >0 if successful
- *  0  on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics)
  */
-int
+void
 login_logout(struct logininfo *li)
 {
 	li->type = LTYPE_LOGOUT;
-	return login_write(li);
+	login_write(li);
 }
 
 
@@ -309,15 +301,9 @@
  ** login_write: Call low-level recording functions based on autoconf
  ** results
  **/
-int
+void
 login_write (struct logininfo *li)
 {
-#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
-	if ((int)geteuid() != 0) {
-	  return 1;
-	}
-#endif
-
 	/* set the timestamp */
 	login_set_current_time(li);
 #ifdef USE_LOGIN
@@ -340,7 +326,6 @@
 #ifdef USE_WTMPX
 	wtmpx_write_entry(li);
 #endif
-	return 0;
 }
 
 #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/src/loginrec.h dropbear-2025.89/src/loginrec.h
--- dropbear-2025.88/src/loginrec.h	2025-05-07 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/src/loginrec.h	2025-12-16 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
@@ -161,8 +161,8 @@
 void login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *li);
 
 /* record the entry */
-int login_login (struct logininfo *li);
-int login_logout(struct logininfo *li);
+void login_login (struct logininfo *li);
+void login_logout(struct logininfo *li);
 #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
 int login_utmp_only(struct logininfo *li);
 #endif
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@
 /** End of public functions */
 
 /* record the entry */
-int login_write (struct logininfo *li);
+void login_write (struct logininfo *li);
 int login_log_entry(struct logininfo *li);
 
 /* produce various forms of the line filename */
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/src/runopts.h dropbear-2025.89/src/runopts.h
--- dropbear-2025.88/src/runopts.h	2025-05-07 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/src/runopts.h	2025-12-16 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
 int readhostkey(const char * filename, sign_key * hostkey,
 	enum signkey_type *type);
 void load_all_hostkeys(void);
+void disable_sig_except(enum signature_type sig_type);
 
 typedef struct svr_runopts {
 
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/src/scp.c dropbear-2025.89/src/scp.c
--- dropbear-2025.88/src/scp.c	2025-05-07 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/src/scp.c	2025-12-16 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@
 #include "includes.h"
 /*RCSID("$OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.130 2006/01/31 10:35:43 djm Exp $");*/
 
+#include <fnmatch.h>
+
 #include "atomicio.h"
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "scpmisc.h"
@@ -291,14 +293,14 @@
 
 uid_t userid;
 int errs, remin, remout;
-int pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory;
+int Tflag, pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory;
 
 #define	CMDNEEDS	64
 char cmd[CMDNEEDS];		/* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */
 
 int response(void);
 void rsource(char *, struct stat *);
-void sink(int, char *[]);
+void sink(int, char *[], const char *);
 void source(int, char *[]);
 void tolocal(int, char *[]);
 void toremote(char *, int, char *[]);
@@ -325,8 +327,8 @@
 	args.list = NULL;
 	addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program);
 
-	fflag = tflag = 0;
-	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfl:prtvBCc:i:P:q1246S:o:F:")) != -1)
+	fflag = Tflag = tflag = 0;
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfl:prtTvBCc:i:P:q1246S:o:F:")) != -1)
 		switch (ch) {
 		/* User-visible flags. */
 		case '1':
@@ -389,9 +391,12 @@
 			setmode(0, O_BINARY);
 #endif
 			break;
+		case 'T':
+			Tflag = 1;
+			break;
 		default:
 			usage();
-		}
+	}
 	argc -= optind;
 	argv += optind;
 
@@ -409,7 +414,7 @@
 	}
 	if (tflag) {
 		/* Receive data. */
-		sink(argc, argv);
+		sink(argc, argv, NULL);
 		exit(errs != 0);
 	}
 	if (argc < 2)
@@ -589,7 +594,7 @@
 			continue;
 		}
 		xfree(bp);
-		sink(1, argv + argc - 1);
+		sink(1, argv + argc - 1, src);
 		(void) close(remin);
 		remin = remout = -1;
 	}
@@ -822,7 +827,7 @@
 }
 
 void
-sink(int argc, char **argv)
+sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src)
 {
 	static BUF buffer;
 	struct stat stb;
@@ -836,6 +841,7 @@
 	off_t size, statbytes;
 	int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0;
 	char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048];
+	char *src_copy = NULL, *restrict_pattern = NULL;
 	struct timeval tv[2];
 
 #define	atime	tv[0]
@@ -857,6 +863,17 @@
 	(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
 	if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
 		targisdir = 1;
+	if (src != NULL && !iamrecursive && !Tflag) {
+		/*
+		 * Prepare to try to restrict incoming filenames to match
+		 * the requested destination file glob.
+		 */
+		if ((src_copy = strdup(src)) == NULL)
+			fatal("strdup failed");
+		if ((restrict_pattern = strrchr(src_copy, '/')) != NULL) {
+			*restrict_pattern++ = '\0';
+		}
+	}
 	for (first = 1;; first = 0) {
 		cp = buf;
 		if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1)
@@ -939,6 +956,9 @@
 			run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp);
 			exit(1);
 		}
+		if (restrict_pattern != NULL &&
+		    fnmatch(restrict_pattern, cp, 0) != 0)
+			SCREWUP("filename does not match request");
 		if (targisdir) {
 			static char *namebuf = NULL;
 			static size_t cursize = 0;
@@ -977,7 +997,7 @@
 					goto bad;
 			}
 			vect[0] = xstrdup(np);
-			sink(1, vect);
+			sink(1, vect, src);
 			if (setimes) {
 				setimes = 0;
 				if (utimes(vect[0], tv) < 0)
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/src/session.h dropbear-2025.89/src/session.h
--- dropbear-2025.88/src/session.h	2025-05-07 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/src/session.h	2025-12-16 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
@@ -276,6 +276,12 @@
 	/* The instance created by the plugin_new function */
 	struct PluginInstance *plugin_instance;
 #endif
+
+#if DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS
+	/* Set to 1 when utmp_gid is valid */
+	int have_utmp_gid;
+	gid_t utmp_gid;
+#endif
 };
 
 typedef enum {
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/src/svr-agentfwd.c dropbear-2025.89/src/svr-agentfwd.c
--- dropbear-2025.88/src/svr-agentfwd.c	2025-05-07 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/src/svr-agentfwd.c	2025-12-16 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@
 
 	if (chansess->agentfile != NULL && chansess->agentdir != NULL) {
 
-#if DROPBEAR_SVR_MULTIUSER
+#if !DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS
 		/* Remove the dir as the user. That way they can't cause problems except
 		 * for themselves */
 		uid = getuid();
@@ -160,6 +160,9 @@
 			(seteuid(ses.authstate.pw_uid)) < 0) {
 			dropbear_exit("Failed to set euid");
 		}
+#else
+		(void)uid;
+		(void)gid;
 #endif
 
 		/* 2 for "/" and "\0" */
@@ -172,7 +175,7 @@
 
 		rmdir(chansess->agentdir);
 
-#if DROPBEAR_SVR_MULTIUSER
+#if !DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS
 		if ((seteuid(uid)) < 0 ||
 			(setegid(gid)) < 0) {
 			dropbear_exit("Failed to revert euid");
@@ -219,7 +222,7 @@
 	gid_t gid;
 	int ret = DROPBEAR_FAILURE;
 
-#if DROPBEAR_SVR_MULTIUSER
+#if !DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS
 	/* drop to user privs to make the dir/file */
 	uid = getuid();
 	gid = getgid();
@@ -227,6 +230,9 @@
 		(seteuid(ses.authstate.pw_uid)) < 0) {
 		dropbear_exit("Failed to set euid");
 	}
+#else
+		(void)uid;
+		(void)gid;
 #endif
 
 	memset((void*)&addr, 0x0, sizeof(addr));
@@ -267,7 +273,7 @@
 
 
 out:
-#if DROPBEAR_SVR_MULTIUSER
+#if !DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS
 	if ((seteuid(uid)) < 0 ||
 		(setegid(gid)) < 0) {
 		dropbear_exit("Failed to revert euid");
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/src/svr-auth.c dropbear-2025.89/src/svr-auth.c
--- dropbear-2025.88/src/svr-auth.c	2025-05-07 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/src/svr-auth.c	2025-12-16 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
@@ -389,9 +389,9 @@
 
 		/* Desired total delay 300ms +-50ms (in nanoseconds).
 		Beware of integer overflow if increasing these values */
-		const int mindelay = 250000000;
-		const unsigned int vardelay = 100000000;
-		suseconds_t rand_delay;
+		const uint32_t mindelay = 250000000;
+		const uint32_t vardelay = 100000000;
+		uint32_t rand_delay;
 		struct timespec delay;
 
 		gettime_wrapper(&delay);
@@ -407,7 +407,7 @@
 		genrandom((unsigned char*)&rand_delay, sizeof(rand_delay));
 		rand_delay = mindelay + (rand_delay % vardelay);
 
-		if (delay.tv_sec == 0 && delay.tv_nsec <= mindelay) {
+		if (delay.tv_sec == 0 && delay.tv_nsec <= rand_delay) {
 			/* Compensate for elapsed time */
 			delay.tv_nsec = rand_delay - delay.tv_nsec;
 		} else {
@@ -457,12 +457,23 @@
 	/* authdone must be set after encrypt_packet() for 
 	 * delayed-zlib mode */
 	ses.authstate.authdone = 1;
+
+#if DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS
+	/* Drop privileges as soon as authentication has happened. */
+	svr_switch_user();
+#endif
 	ses.connect_time = 0;
 
 
+#if DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS
+	/* If running as the user, we can rely on the OS
+	 * to limit allowed ports */
+	ses.allowprivport = 1;
+#else
 	if (ses.authstate.pw_uid == 0) {
 		ses.allowprivport = 1;
 	}
+#endif
 
 	/* Remove from the list of pre-auth sockets. Should be m_close(), since if
 	 * we fail, we might end up leaking connection slots, and disallow new
@@ -472,3 +483,94 @@
 	TRACE(("leave send_msg_userauth_success"))
 
 }
+
+#if DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS
+/* Returns DROPBEAR_SUCCESS or DROPBEAR_FAILURE */
+static int utmp_gid(gid_t *ret_gid) {
+	struct group *utmp_gr = getgrnam("utmp");
+	if (!utmp_gr) {
+		TRACE(("No utmp group"));
+		return DROPBEAR_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	*ret_gid = utmp_gr->gr_gid;
+	return DROPBEAR_SUCCESS;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* Switch to the ses.authstate user.
+ * Fails if not running as root and the user differs.
+ *
+ * This may be called either after authentication, or 
+ * after shell/command fork if DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS is unset.
+ */
+void svr_switch_user(void) {
+	assert(ses.authstate.authdone);
+
+	/* We can only change uid/gid as root ... */
+	if (getuid() == 0) {
+
+		if ((setgid(ses.authstate.pw_gid) < 0) ||
+			(initgroups(ses.authstate.pw_name, 
+						ses.authstate.pw_gid) < 0)) {
+			dropbear_exit("Error changing user group");
+		}
+
+#if DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS
+		/* Retain utmp saved group so that wtmp/utmp can be written */
+		int ret = utmp_gid(&svr_ses.utmp_gid);
+		if (ret == DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) {
+			/* Set saved gid to utmp so that it can be
+			 * restored for login_logout() etc. This saved
+			 * group is cleared by the OS on execve() */
+			int rc = setresgid(-1, -1, svr_ses.utmp_gid);
+			if (rc == 0) {
+				svr_ses.have_utmp_gid = 1;
+			} else {
+				/* Will not attempt to switch to utmp gid.
+				 * login() etc may fail. */
+				TRACE(("utmp setresgid failed"));
+			}
+		}
+#endif
+
+		if (setuid(ses.authstate.pw_uid) < 0) {
+			dropbear_exit("Error changing user");
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* ... but if the daemon is the same uid as the requested uid, we don't
+		 * need to */
+
+		/* XXX - there is a minor issue here, in that if there are multiple
+		 * usernames with the same uid, but differing groups, then the
+		 * differing groups won't be set (as with initgroups()). The solution
+		 * is for the sysadmin not to give out the UID twice */
+		if (getuid() != ses.authstate.pw_uid) {
+			dropbear_exit("Couldn't	change user as non-root");
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+void svr_raise_gid_utmp(void) {
+#if DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS
+	if (!svr_ses.have_utmp_gid) {
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (setegid(svr_ses.utmp_gid) != 0) {
+		dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "failed setegid");
+	}
+#endif
+}
+
+void svr_restore_gid(void) {
+#if DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS
+	if (!svr_ses.have_utmp_gid) {
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (setegid(getgid()) != 0) {
+		dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "failed setegid");
+	}
+#endif
+}
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/src/svr-authpubkey.c dropbear-2025.89/src/svr-authpubkey.c
--- dropbear-2025.88/src/svr-authpubkey.c	2025-05-07 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/src/svr-authpubkey.c	2025-12-16 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
@@ -186,12 +186,14 @@
 
 #if DROPBEAR_SK_ECDSA || DROPBEAR_SK_ED25519
 	key->sk_flags_mask = SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD;
+#if DROPBEAR_SVR_PUBKEY_OPTIONS_BUILT
 	if (ses.authstate.pubkey_options && ses.authstate.pubkey_options->no_touch_required_flag) {
 		key->sk_flags_mask &= ~SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD;
 	}
 	if (ses.authstate.pubkey_options && ses.authstate.pubkey_options->verify_required_flag) {
 		key->sk_flags_mask |= SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD;
 	}
+#endif /* DROPBEAR_SVR_PUBKEY_OPTIONS */
 #endif
 
 	/* create the data which has been signed - this a string containing
@@ -513,7 +515,13 @@
 		line_num++;
 
 		ret = checkpubkey_line(line, line_num, filename, keyalgo, keyalgolen,
-			keyblob, keybloblen, &ses.authstate.pubkey_info);
+			keyblob, keybloblen,
+#if DROPBEAR_SVR_PUBKEY_OPTIONS_BUILT
+			&ses.authstate.pubkey_info
+#else
+			NULL
+#endif
+		);
 		if (ret == DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) {
 			break;
 		}
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/src/svr-authpubkeyoptions.c dropbear-2025.89/src/svr-authpubkeyoptions.c
--- dropbear-2025.88/src/svr-authpubkeyoptions.c	2025-05-07 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/src/svr-authpubkeyoptions.c	2025-12-16 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
@@ -70,6 +70,12 @@
 	return 1;
 }
 
+/* Returns 1 if a forced command pubkey option is set */
+int svr_pubkey_has_forced_command(void) {
+	return ses.authstate.pubkey_options
+		&& ses.authstate.pubkey_options->forced_command;
+}
+
 /* Returns 1 if pubkey allows x11 forwarding,
  * 0 otherwise */
 int svr_pubkey_allows_x11fwd() {
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/src/svr-chansession.c dropbear-2025.89/src/svr-chansession.c
--- dropbear-2025.88/src/svr-chansession.c	2025-05-07 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/src/svr-chansession.c	2025-12-16 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
@@ -326,7 +326,11 @@
 	if (chansess->tty) {
 		/* write the utmp/wtmp login record */
 		li = chansess_login_alloc(chansess);
+
+		svr_raise_gid_utmp();
 		login_logout(li);
+		svr_restore_gid();
+
 		login_free_entry(li);
 
 		pty_release(chansess->tty);
@@ -847,7 +851,11 @@
 		 * terminal used for stdout with the dup2 above, otherwise
 		 * the wtmp login will not be recorded */
 		li = chansess_login_alloc(chansess);
+
+		svr_raise_gid_utmp();
 		login_login(li);
+		svr_restore_gid();
+
 		login_free_entry(li);
 
 		/* Can now dup2 stderr. Messages from login_login() have gone
@@ -980,30 +988,8 @@
 #endif /* DEBUG_VALGRIND */
 	}
 
-#if DROPBEAR_SVR_MULTIUSER
-	/* We can only change uid/gid as root ... */
-	if (getuid() == 0) {
-
-		if ((setgid(ses.authstate.pw_gid) < 0) ||
-			(initgroups(ses.authstate.pw_name, 
-						ses.authstate.pw_gid) < 0)) {
-			dropbear_exit("Error changing user group");
-		}
-		if (setuid(ses.authstate.pw_uid) < 0) {
-			dropbear_exit("Error changing user");
-		}
-	} else {
-		/* ... but if the daemon is the same uid as the requested uid, we don't
-		 * need to */
-
-		/* XXX - there is a minor issue here, in that if there are multiple
-		 * usernames with the same uid, but differing groups, then the
-		 * differing groups won't be set (as with initgroups()). The solution
-		 * is for the sysadmin not to give out the UID twice */
-		if (getuid() != ses.authstate.pw_uid) {
-			dropbear_exit("Couldn't	change user as non-root");
-		}
-	}
+#if !DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS
+	svr_switch_user();
 #endif
 
 	/* set env vars */
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/src/svr-kex.c dropbear-2025.89/src/svr-kex.c
--- dropbear-2025.88/src/svr-kex.c	2025-05-07 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/src/svr-kex.c	2025-12-16 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
@@ -99,6 +99,14 @@
 	}
 #endif
 
+	if (!ses.kexstate.donesecondkex) {
+		/* Disable other signature types.
+		 * During future rekeying, privileges may have been dropped
+		 * so other keys won't be loadable.
+		 * This must occur after send_msg_ext_info() which uses the hostkey list */
+		disable_sig_except(ses.newkeys->algo_signature);
+	}
+
 	ses.requirenext = SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS;
 	TRACE(("leave recv_msg_kexdh_init"))
 }
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/src/svr-runopts.c dropbear-2025.89/src/svr-runopts.c
--- dropbear-2025.88/src/svr-runopts.c	2025-05-07 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/src/svr-runopts.c	2025-12-16 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
@@ -253,6 +253,9 @@
 				case 'j':
 					svr_opts.nolocaltcp = 1;
 					break;
+#else
+				case 'j':
+					break;
 #endif
 #if DROPBEAR_SVR_REMOTETCPFWD
 				case 'k':
@@ -261,6 +264,9 @@
 				case 'a':
 					opts.listen_fwd_all = 1;
 					break;
+#else
+				case 'k':
+					break;
 #endif
 #if INETD_MODE
 				case 'i':
@@ -289,6 +295,9 @@
 				case 'm':
 					svr_opts.domotd = 0;
 					break;
+#else
+				case 'm':
+					break;
 #endif
 				case 'w':
 					svr_opts.norootlogin = 1;
@@ -323,6 +332,10 @@
 				case 't':
 					svr_opts.multiauthmethod = 1;
 					break;
+#else
+				case 's':
+				case 'g':
+					break;
 #endif
 				case 'h':
 					printhelp(argv[0]);
@@ -514,6 +527,17 @@
 		}
 	}
 }
+
+void disable_sig_except(enum signature_type allow_type) {
+	int i;
+	TRACE(("Disabling other sigs except %d", allow_type));
+	for (i = 0; sigalgs[i].name != NULL; i++) {
+		enum signature_type sig_type = sigalgs[i].val;
+		if (sig_type != allow_type) {
+			sigalgs[i].usable = 0;
+		}
+	}
+}
 
 static void loadhostkey_helper(const char *name, void** src, void** dst, int fatal_duplicate) {
 	if (*dst) {
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/src/svr-tcpfwd.c dropbear-2025.89/src/svr-tcpfwd.c
--- dropbear-2025.88/src/svr-tcpfwd.c	2025-05-07 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/src/svr-tcpfwd.c	2025-12-16 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
@@ -346,6 +346,11 @@
 
 	TRACE(("streamlocal channel %d", channel->index))
 
+	if (svr_opts.forced_command || svr_pubkey_has_forced_command()) {
+		TRACE(("leave newstreamlocal: no unix forwarding for forced command"))
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	if (svr_opts.nolocaltcp || !svr_pubkey_allows_tcpfwd()) {
 		TRACE(("leave newstreamlocal: local unix forwarding disabled"))
 		goto out;
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/src/sysoptions.h dropbear-2025.89/src/sysoptions.h
--- dropbear-2025.88/src/sysoptions.h	2025-05-07 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/src/sysoptions.h	2025-12-16 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *******************************************************************/
 
 #ifndef DROPBEAR_VERSION
-#define DROPBEAR_VERSION "2025.88"
+#define DROPBEAR_VERSION "2025.89"
 #endif
 
 /* IDENT_VERSION_PART is the optional part after "SSH-2.0-dropbear". Refer to RFC4253 for requirements. */
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@
 /* LTC SHA384 depends on SHA512 */
 #define DROPBEAR_SHA512 ((DROPBEAR_SHA2_512_HMAC) || (DROPBEAR_ECC_521) \
 			|| (DROPBEAR_SHA384) || (DROPBEAR_DH_GROUP16) \
-			|| (DROPBEAR_ED25519))
+			|| (DROPBEAR_ED25519) || (DROPBEAR_SNTRUP761))
 
 #define DROPBEAR_DH_GROUP14 ((DROPBEAR_DH_GROUP14_SHA256) || (DROPBEAR_DH_GROUP14_SHA1))
 
@@ -243,9 +243,6 @@
 #define RECV_MAX_PACKET_LEN (MAX(35000, ((RECV_MAX_PAYLOAD_LEN)+100)))
 
 /* for channel code */
-#define TRANS_MAX_WINDOW 500000000 /* 500MB is sufficient, stopping overflow */
-#define TRANS_MAX_WIN_INCR 500000000 /* overflow prevention */
-
 #define RECV_WINDOWEXTEND (opts.recv_window / 3) /* We send a "window extend" every
 								RECV_WINDOWEXTEND bytes */
 #define MAX_RECV_WINDOW (10*1024*1024) /* 10 MB should be enough */
@@ -269,7 +266,7 @@
 #else
 /* 521 bit ecdsa key */
 #define MAX_PUBKEY_SIZE 200
-#define MAX_PRIVKEY_SIZE 200
+#define MAX_PRIVKEY_SIZE 250
 #endif
 
 /* For kex hash buffer, worst case size for Q_C || Q_S || K */
@@ -335,7 +332,7 @@
 
 /* PAM requires ./configure --enable-pam */
 #if !defined(HAVE_LIBPAM) && DROPBEAR_SVR_PAM_AUTH
-#error "DROPBEAR_SVR_PATM_AUTH requires PAM headers. Perhaps ./configure --enable-pam ?"
+#error "DROPBEAR_SVR_PAM_AUTH requires PAM headers. Perhaps ./configure --enable-pam ?"
 #endif
 
 #if DROPBEAR_SVR_PASSWORD_AUTH && !HAVE_CRYPT
@@ -358,6 +355,10 @@
 	#error "At least one hostkey or public-key algorithm must be enabled; RSA is recommended."
 #endif
 
+#if DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS && !defined(HAVE_SETRESGID)
+	#error "DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS requires setresgid()."
+#endif
+
 /* Source for randomness. This must be able to provide hundreds of bytes per SSH
  * connection without blocking. */
 #ifndef DROPBEAR_URANDOM_DEV
@@ -443,6 +444,14 @@
 #define DROPBEAR_MULTI 0
 #endif
 
+#if !DROPBEAR_SVR_MULTIUSER && DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS
+#error DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS needs DROPBEAR_SVR_MULTIUSER
+#endif
+
+#if !(DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS || !DROPBEAR_SVR_MULTIUSER) && DROPBEAR_SVR_LOCALSTREAMFWD 
+#error DROPBEAR_SVR_LOCALSTREAMFWD requires DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS or !DROPBEAR_SVR_MULTIUSER
+#endif
+
 /* Fuzzing expects all key types to be enabled */
 #if DROPBEAR_FUZZ
 #if defined(DROPBEAR_DSS)
diff -Nru dropbear-2025.88/test/test_dropbear.py dropbear-2025.89/test/test_dropbear.py
--- dropbear-2025.88/test/test_dropbear.py	2025-05-07 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
+++ dropbear-2025.89/test/test_dropbear.py	2025-12-16 14:30:00.000000000 +0000
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@
 class HandleTcp(socketserver.ThreadingMixIn, socketserver.TCPServer):
 
 	# override TCPServer's default, avoids TIME_WAIT
-	allow_reuse_addr = True
+	allow_reuse_address = True
 
 	""" Listens for a single incoming request, sends a response if given,
 	and returns the inbound data.